The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under The U.N. Charter by Hossain, Kamrul
Santa Clara Journal of International Law
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 3
1-1-2005
The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation
Under The U.N. Charter
Kamrul Hossain
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Kamrul Hossain, The Concept of Jus Cogens and the Obligation Under The U.N. Charter, 3 Santa Clara J. Int'l L. 72 (2005).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/scujil/vol3/iss1/3
Vol. 3 [2005]        JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER               72  
Kamrul Hossain 
 
 
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF JUS COGENS  
AND THE OBLIGATION UNDER THE U.N. CHARTER 
 
Kamrul Hossain* 
 
ABSTRACT 
By virtue of Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, an 
obligation under the Charter prevails over an obligation arising out of any 
other international agreement.  The decisions in the Security Council that 
give rise to a compelling obligation upon the member states are taken 
mostly by means of political consideration.  Article 103 obligates all 
member states to comply with these decisions.  Since member states 
agreed to carry out the decisions of the Security Council in Article 25, this 
Article 103 obligation operates irrespective of any other obligation arising 
out of other treaties or agreement, even if it is contrary to those of general 
U.N. obligations.  The question, however, is whether a Charter obligation 
could override an obligation that represents the norm of jus cogens.  This 
article discusses the concept of jus cogens, its peremptory nature and how 
the Charter of the United Nations reflects the norm of jus cogens as its 
fundamental principle.  Thus, any decision taken under the Charter should 
conform to the norm of jus cogens. 
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Jus cogens, the literal meaning of which is “compelling law,” is 
the technical term given to those norms of general international law that 
are argued as hierarchically superior.1  These are, in fact, a set of rules, 
which are peremptory in nature and from which no derogation is allowed 
under any circumstances.  The doctrine of international jus cogens was 
developed under a strong influence of natural law concepts, which 
maintain that states cannot be absolutely free in establishing their 
contractual relations.  States were obliged to respect certain fundamental 
principles deeply rooted in the international community.2  The power of a 
state to make treaties is subdued when it confronts a super-customary 
norm of jus cogens. 3   In other words, jus cogens are rules, which 
correspond to the fundamental norm of international public policy and in 
which cannot be altered unless a subsequent norm of the same standard is 
established.  This means that the position of the rules of jus cogens is 
hierarchically superior compared to other ordinary rules of international 
law.   
In fact, there are rules, which are preconditions for effective 
international activity, such as pacta sunt servanda.  To abrogate such a 
rule is not possible.  A treaty providing that pacta sunt servanda is mere 
reaffirmation.  A treaty denying it is an absurdity.  The point is that the 
very activity of treaty-making assumes the general rule which complies 
with the international public policy and is accepted by the international 
                                                 
* (LL.M, LL.Lic.) Doctoral candidate, University of Helsinki. 
1 REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 1994). 
2  See Gennady M. Danilenko, International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making, 2 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 42, 44 (1991), available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html.  
3 DAVID KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES 26-27 (Nomos ed., 1987). 
Under the stewardship of its fourth Rapporteur, Weldock, the International Law 
Commission [hereinafter ILC] undertook in-depth discussion of jus cogens.  As reflected 
in the relevant ILC Yearbooks, that there was agreement in regards to the existence of the 
rules of jus cogens and the peremptory norms were viewed as norms from which states 
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community at large.4  Rules contrary to the notion of jus cogens could be 
regarded as void, since those rules oppose the fundamental norms of 
international public policy. 
As a result, jus cogens rules gained the nature of international 
constitutional rules for two reasons.  First, they limit the ability of states to 
create or change rules of international law.  Second, these rules prevent 
states from violating fundamental rules of international public policy since 
the resulting rules or violations of rules would be seriously detrimental to 
the international legal system.5  Clearly defined contents of the rules of jus 
cogens are not yet likely to be decided.  Existence of such norms is now 
universally recognized and well established.   
Recognition of Jus Cogens in International Law 
During the early nineteenth century, recognition of jus cogens was 
established. Professor Oppenheim stated that there existed a number of 
“universally recognized principles” of international law that rendered any 
conflicting treaty void, and therefore, the peremptory effect of such 
principles was itself a “unanimously recognized customary rule of 
International Law.”6  For example, he stated that a treaty supporting piracy 
is void for being contrary to the “universally recognized principles” of 
international law.7  Moreover, the concept of jus cogens twice found favor 
                                                                                                                         
cannot contract out. See [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, U.N. Doc.  
A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963.  
4 JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 79-80 (1979). 
5 See Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship between Jus Cogens and Erga 
Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT’L L. nos. 2-3 211, 219-220 (1997).  
6 OPPENHEIM ET AL., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW VOL. 1 PEACE,  
introduction & part I (1992). 
7 Id. at 528. During the years of 1963 to 1966, several members pointed out in the ILC 
commentary that the emergence of rules having the character of jus cogens was not the 
product of recent time, rather it has more long-standing character.  They further stated 
that the concept of jus cogens had originated in regard to such universal crimes as piracy 
and the slave-trade as well as such principles as the freedom of high seas and other rules 
on the law of the sea. For more information, see LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY 
NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 161-62 (1988).  
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in a judicial context, first, in the decision of the French-Mexican Claims 
Commission in the 1928 Pablo Nájera Case, and later by Judge Schücking 
of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the 1934 Oscar Chinn 
Case [1934] PCIJ 2 (12 December 1934).8 Subsequent to this 1934 case, 
judges of the International Court of Justice made similar references to jus 
cogens in a number of separate and dissenting opinions.9  For example, in 
a 1993 Bosnian case, Judge Lauterpacht expressed his opinion on the 
possibility that the Security Council had violated the genocide prohibition 
and therewith alleged jus cogens when imposing an arms embargo on both 
Serbia and Bosnia.  In 1991, Resolution 713 of the Security Council 
imposed arms embargo.  While this resolution disregarded the state’s 
inherent right of self-defense, the Security Council had been unable to take 
measures necessary to maintain peace and security in Bosnia.  The 
consequences led to ethnic cleansing, genocide and large-scale human 
sufferings.  Therefore, the argument of alleged violation of jus cogens has 
some potential weight.   
Furthermore, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has 
given the recognition of the norms of jus cogens in Article 53, where it 
states: 
A treaty is void, if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts 
with a peremptory norm of general international law.  For 
the purpose of the present convention, a peremptory norm 
of general international law is a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole, as a norm from which no derogation is permitted 
                                                 
8 Byers, supra note 5, at 213-214 n.8-9.  
9 Id. at 214 n.10. For the opinion of the ICJ, see, for example, Application of the 
Convention of 1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Neth. v. Swed.)1958 I.C.J. 
55 (Nov. 28) (separate opinion of Judge Quintana); Right of Passage Over Indian 
Territory (Port. v. India) 1960 I.C.J. 6 (Apr. 12) (separate opinion of Judge ad hoc 
Fernandes); South West Aftica Case, Second Phase (Eth. v.  S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.) 
1966 I.C.J. 6 (July 18) (separate opinion of Judge Tanaka); North Sea Continental Shelf 
Cases (F.R.G./Den. v. F.R.G./Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20) (separate opinion of Judge 
Nervo). 
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and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of 
general international law having the same character.10 
That means a treaty is no longer an international legal document, if, at the 
time of its conclusion, it conflicts with the norms of jus cogens, which are 
peremptory in nature.  This article sets up the four criteria for a norm to be 
determined as jus cogens, specifically: (1) status as a norm of general 
international law; (2) acceptance by the international community of states 
as a whole; (3) immunity from derogation; and (4) modifiable only by a 
new norm having the same status. 
On the other hand, Finnish scholar Lauri Hannikainen 
demonstrated that if a norm of general international law protects an 
overriding interest or value of the international community, and if any 
derogation would seriously jeopardize that interest or value, then the 
peremptory character of the norm may be presumed if the application of 
the criteria of peremptory norms produces no noteworthy negative 
evidence.11  
Recognition of the rules of jus cogens was again confirmed in 
1986 at the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or Between International Organizations.  The 
importance of the rules of jus cogens was confirmed by the trend to apply 
it beyond the law of the treaties, in particular, in the law of state 
responsibility.  Specifically, the International Law Commission (ILC) 
proposed the notion of international crimes resulting from the breach by a 
state of an international obligation “essential for the protection of 
fundamental interests of the international community,” which is, in fact, 
                                                 
10 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 
39/ 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm. 
11 LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
20, 207.  
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closely linked to the doctrine of international jus cogens. 12  In the 
Nicaragua Case, the International Court of Justice clearly affirmed jus 
cogens as an accepted doctrine in international law.13  The ICJ relied on 
the prohibition on the use of force as being “a conspicuous example of a 
rule of international law having the character of jus cogens.”14 
Status of the Norm in International Law 
A peremptory norm may, it would appear, be derived from a 
custom or a treaty, but not, it is submitted, from any other source.15  This 
statement is, however, self-contradictory.  Indeed, there are serious 
problems associated with the assertions that a norm of jus cogens could be 
the result of the natural law, or, one or any of the traditional primary 
sources of international law, namely, treaties, customs or general 
principles of laws.16  According to Professor Michale Byers of the Duke 
University Law School, treaties can, at best, only be contributing factors in 
the development of jus cogens rules for two reasons.  First, a treaty cannot 
bind its parties’ abilities to modify the treaty terms nor to relieve the 
party’s obligations under it, such as through a subsequent treaty to which 
all the same parties have consented.  Second, all generally accepted jus 
cogens rules apply universally yet none of the treaties, which have 
codified these rules, have been universally ratified.  No treaty, not even 
the Charter of the Charter of the United Nations, can establish a rule of 
                                                 
12 See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 43; Byers, supra note 5, at 214; Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, art. 19, available at http://www.javier-leon-
diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf.  
13 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (Jun. 27).  
14 See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 42 (discussing Nicar. V. U.S.).  
15 WALLACE, supra note 1, at 33. In the Nicaragua Case, the I.C.J. clearly proceeded on 
the assumption that the peremptory rule prohibiting the use of force was based not on 
some exotic source, but on the two most commonly used and established sources of law, 
namely treaty and custom. See Military and Paramilitary Activities, 1986 I.C.J. at 97, 
100. 
16 Byers, supra note 5, at 220-221 n.34. 
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general international law.  Treaties can only create obligations between 
their parties.17   
As for the assertion that jus cogens rules to be considered as 
customary international law, more ambiguity exists. Customs are binding 
only in the case of an established opinio juris wherein a state believes to 
be bound by a said practice due to its creation from customary rule.  
However, persistent objection of any customary principle creates an 
exception to have the binding nature of such rules.  There are also other 
ways to supersede customary rules, such as through the development of 
rules of special customary international law and the conclusion of treaties.  
On the other hand, in case of the rules of jus cogens, these rules are 
binding regardless of the consent of the parties concerned and regardless 
of the states’ own individual opinion to be bound since these rules are too 
fundamental for states to escape responsibility.  Modification of the rules 
of jus cogens is only possible when a new peremptory norm of equal 
weight emerges.   
As for the binding character of jus cogens, acceptance by the large 
majority of states of such norm would amount to universal legal obligation 
for the international community as a whole.  These are superior rules and 
bear the common values for the international community as a whole.  
Michael Byers, however, tends to show that jus cogens rules are derived 
from the “process of customary international law,” which is itself a part of 
international constitutional order. 18   He argues that opinio juris (or 
something resembling opinio juris) appears to be at the root of the non-
detractable character of jus cogens rules, because states simply do not 
                                                 
17 Id.  at 221. See also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10, arts. 34, 
39, available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm; Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility, supra note 12, art. 29(1), available at http://www.javier-leon-
diaz.com/humanitarianIssues/State_Resp.pdf. 
18 Byers, supra note 5, at 222. 
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believe that it is possible to contract out of jus cogens rules or to 
persistently object to them.  States regard these rules as being so important 
to the international society of states and to how that society defines itself, 
such that they cannot conceive of an exception.19  Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention, however, contains no reference to any element of practice.  
One could then hardly conceive jus cogens as a strengthened form of 
custom.20  David Kennedy termed jus cogens as super-customary norm.21   
In fact, two views predominate regarding the foundation of the 
concept of jus cogens, the first, as directly originating from international 
law, or the second, as being based on the one of the existing sources of 
international law.  However, some argue and accept that jus cogens 
recognizes a wholly new source of law capable of generally binding rules.  
This idea was developed during the Vienna Conference on the Law of the 
Treaties at which jus cogens was interpreted to indicate that a majority 
could bring into existence peremptory norms which could bind the 
international community of states as a whole, regardless of the individual 
consent of the states.  Thus, the result is a new source of law founded on 
the basis that a community as a whole may create rules that will bind all 
its members, notwithstanding their possible individual dissent.  Others 
argue that the existing sources have been modified to allow majority rule-
making in the context of higher law.22 However, the negotiating history of 
the Vienna Convention does not support the view that the notion of jus 
cogens emerges as a new source of general international law.  Rather, 
there was a clear tendency to view jus cogens as the product of the 
                                                 
19 Id. at 221 
20 See generally Danilenko, supra note 2, available at 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html. 
21 See KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
22 See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 42.  
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existing sources.23  For example, France argued that if the draft article on 
jus cogens was interpreted to mean that a majority could bring into 
existence peremptory norms that would be valid erga omnes, then the 
result created an international source of law.  France objected to such a 
possibility on the ground that such a new source of law would be subject 
to no “control and lacking all responsibility.”24   
Moreover, complexity remains in the interpretation of Article 53, 
regarding the phrase: “acceptance and recognized by the international 
community of States as a whole.”  M.K. Yasseen, the former Chairman of 
the Drafting Committee of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 
states that 
[T]here is no question of requiring a rule to be accepted and 
recognized as peremptory by all States.  It would be enough 
if a very large majority did so; that would mean that, if one 
state in isolation refused to accept the peremptory character 
of a rule, or if that state was supported by a very small 
number of states, the acceptance and recognition of the 
peremptory character of the rule by the international 
community as a whole would not be affected.25  
Yasseen further stated that no individual state should have the right of 
veto.  Additionally, in the ILC commentary to the Article 19 of the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility, it explained the meaning of “as a whole” 
within the context of requiring international recognition of international 
crimes:  
[T]his certainly does not mean the requirement of 
unanimous recognition by all the members of the 
community, which would give each state an inconceivable 
right of veto.  What it is intended to ensure is that a given 
international wrongful act shall be recognized as an 
“international crime”, not only by some particular group of 
                                                 
23 Id. 
24 U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties I, at 94.   
25 Id. at 472 
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states, even if it constitutes a majority, but by all the 
essential components of the international community.26 
This means that “a very large majority” will not necessarily be able to 
impose its will on “a very small minority” if that “small minority” 
represents a significant element of the international community.  The same 
view was expressed at the Vienna Conference by the representative of the 
United States, namely, that the recognition of the peremptory character of 
a norm “would require, at a minimum, absence of dissent by any important 
element of the international community.”27  The representative of Australia 
stressed that “rules could only be regarded as having the status of jus 
cogens if there was the substantial concurrence of states belonging to all 
principal legal systems.”28  
Debate continues, not concerning the existence of the notion of jus 
cogens, but on two other issues. The first one concerns the status of jus 
cogens either as a new source of international law or as part of other 
existing sources of international law. The second one concerns the process 
of law-making under the norm of jus cogens.  While there is realistically 
no special source for creating constitutional or fundamental principles in 
the present international legal order, we all know that international law 
itself is under the constant process of development —  “development 
towards greater coherence.”29  
The existence of the concept of jus cogens was, nonetheless, not 
denied by the states at the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties.  
Rather, it was argued that the essence of the concept is that it must affect 
all states without exception.  Indeed, states at the Vienna Convention 
                                                 
26 Summary Records of the 1374th Meeting, [1976] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 73, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/291 and Add.1-2. 
27 U.N. Conference on Law of Treaties II, at 102. 
28 Supra note 24, at 388. 
29 CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 79. 
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reached an agreement on a constitutional principle that the peremptory 
norms bound all members of the international community, 
notwithstanding their possible dissent. 30   It was also argued that the 
principal criterion of peremptory rules was considered to be the fact that 
they serve the interest of the international community, not the needs of 
individual states.31  However, some counter with the domestic law analogy 
— good customs, morals and public policies were applied in specific cases 
without insoluble difficulties even though these items were not necessarily 
defined in municipal law.32  Moreover, since the adoption of the Vienna 
Convention on Law of the Treaties, the norm of jus cogens has gained a 
wide support among the commentators and writers.33  Therefore, it could 
be argued that the objecting states are bound by the concept so far as 
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention is declaratory of an already existing 
international law concerning jus cogens.34  In fact, the principle of consent 
is a further structural principle of international law, distinct from jus 
cogens.35   
                                                 
30 Danilenko, supra note 2, available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html. 
31 This view was address by the representative of Zambia at the Vienna Conference, see 
U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties I, at 322. 
32 Statement of the representative of Philippines. See U.N. Conference on Law of Treaties 
II, at 95. 
33 For example, Ch. L. Rozakis writes that once adopted, the peremptory norms bind the 
entire international community and in consequence a state can no longer be dissociated 
from the binding peremptory character of that rule even if it proves that no evidence 
exists of its acceptance and recognition of the function of that rule, or moreover, that it 
has expressly denied; L.A. Alexidze holds that norms of jus cogens are based on the 
common will of the international community and as absolute norms these norms bind 
even dissenters; G.  Gaja maintained that a peremptory norm necessarily operates with 
regard to all states; R.  St.  J.  Macdonald addressed that the consent of a very large 
majority will binding on all states, including those which expressly refused to 
acknowledge them.  See Danilenko, supra note 2, at 51.  
34 Id. 
35 CRAWFORD, supra note 4 at 80. 
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Uncertainty on the contents of Jus Cogens 
Problems remain as to the application of the norm, in terms of 
which rules must necessarily be covered under the said norms.  There was 
serious doubt concerning the fact that the norm could be misused in 
interpreting the rules to be covered under jus cogens.  Over-inclusiveness 
or under-inclusiveness of the facts might come into being.  For example, 
during the negotiating process of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the common focus of the developing countries 
was to ensure that they represented the interests of all mankind since they 
constituted the majority.  However, a very small number of Western states 
opposed the majority’s proposals, particularly those regarding the legal 
status of the seabed.  Consequently, developing countries turned to the 
notion of jus cogens.  They claimed that the principles of common 
heritage of mankind, as proclaimed by the 1970 United Nations General 
Assembly resolution on the seabed, were principles of jus cogens.  This 
argument was clearly rejected by the minority of western states. 36  
Nonetheless, the majority, led by the Group of 77, continued to rely on the 
notion of jus cogens in order to impose specific normative solutions 
regarding the seabed.  The Group of 77 asserted that since the common 
heritage of mankind is a customary rule which has the force of peremptory 
norm, then it would follow that the unilateral legislation and limited 
agreements were illegal and were, therefore, violations of this principle.37   
Another example could be found concerning the legal nature of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources proclaimed in a 
number of the U.N. General Assembly resolutions.  This issue was raised 
at the Vienna Conference on Succession of States in Respect of State 
                                                 
36 See, e.g., Statement of the U.S. Delegation, U.N. Convention on Law of the Sea part 
XVII at 243; Danilenko.  supra note 2, at 59.  
37 U.N. Conference on Law of the Sea part XIV, at 112, Doc.  A/Conf.  621106 (1980).  
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Property, Archives and Debts.  The Draft Convention on Succession of 
States contained a rule requiring that agreements concluded between a 
predecessor state and a newly independent state concerning succession to 
state property of the predecessor state not “infringe the principle of the 
permanent sovereignty of every people over its wealth and natural 
resources.”38 In its commentary to a draft article containing this rule, the 
ILC noted that some of the members of the Commission expressed the 
view that agreements violating the principle of the permanent sovereignty 
should be void ab initio.  Relying on this commentary, the developing 
states claimed that the principle of permanent sovereignty over wealth and 
natural resources was a principle of jus cogens.  The conference was also 
used to impart the jus cogens character to other broad principles, including 
the right of the peoples to development, to information about their history, 
and to their cultural heritage.39  The idea of invoking some of the General 
Assembly Resolutions in terms of the norm of jus cogens, with a plea that 
resolutions achieve support from the large majority of states, was 
criticized by the Western states that resolutions adopted at the General 
Assembly are only recommendatory.  These do not have any binding 
force.   
Therefore, while a very large majority of states support law-
making under the concept of jus cogens at the session in General 
Assembly, it could hardly be possible, unless the other significant 
elements of international community, namely the western states, agreed to 
do so.  Nonetheless, three categories of jus cogens found genuine support, 
as suggested by the German scholar Ulrich Scheuner: 40   (1) the rules 
protecting the foundations of international order, (i.e., the prohibition of 
                                                 
38 Cf. the Draft Convention on Succession of States.  
39 See Danilenko, supra note 2, available at 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html. 
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genocide or of the use of force in international relations except in self-
defense), (2) the rule concerning peaceful cooperation in the protection of 
common interests (i.e., freedom of the seas) and the rules protecting the 
most fundamental and basic human rights, and (3) rules for the protection 
of the civilians in time of war. 
Obligation Under the U.N. Charter 
When the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties is itself a 
treaty at issue, the Security Council, through its decision under Chapter 
VII, may override the treaty obligation by virtue of Article 103.  There 
remains a question of whether the Security Council is permitted to act in 
contrary to the norms of jus cogens, given the constitutional nature of the 
United Nation Charter.  It remains unclear as to how the international 
community, lacking any central legislative authority, can accommodate 
the idea of overriding principles binding all of its members.41  There is a 
growing danger that in the absence of clearly defined procedures for the 
creation of peremptory norms, their emergence and subsequent 
identification may become a matter of conflicting assertions reflecting 
political preference of different groups of states.42  While some of the 
relevant procedural issues have been clarified, a coherent elaboration of 
jus cogens still remains a predominant challenge for the international 
community.43  However, we may construct the argument that the Charter 
had embodied the norms of fundamental importance, which correspond to 
the jus cogens rules.  To many, the Charter constitutes the constitution of 
international law, so the binding character of those norms could thus easily 
be realized. 
                                                                                                                         
40 CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 81. 
41 Danilenko, supra note 2, available at http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol2/No1/art3.html. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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Is The U.N. Charter Compatible to Jus Cogens? 
Three things are to be considered concerning whether the United 
Nations Charter is compatible to jus cogens.  First, the Charter was entered 
into force before the Vienna Convention was even drafted.  Second, the 
Vienna Convention is not retroactive by its terms. Third, the Vienna 
Convention has not seen universal ratification.   
Article 4 of the Vienna Convention provides: 
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in 
the present Convention to which treaties would be subject 
under international law independently of the Convention, 
the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded 
by states after the entry into force of the present 
Convention with regard to such states.44  
That means the Vienna Convention limits its application only to those 
treaties which have been concluded after the Convention’s entry into 
force.  Therefore, there is a question of how the rules of jus cogens, the 
recognition of which is embodied in the article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention, affect the U.N. Charter provisions.   
Debate at the Vienna Conference reflected concern that the 
Convention provisions should preserve the operation of rules of customary 
international law as well as take into account general principles of law, 
which are a separate source of international law.  Article 4 of the Vienna 
Convention was inserted to preserve the application of treaties of any pre-
existent rules of customary international law and general principles of law.  
Therefore, the issue of determining whether jus cogens has application to 
the Charter upon an international law basis other than the Convention 
                                                 
44 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 10 art. 4, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm. 
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regime suggests analysis on whether jus cogens constitutes a codification 
of customary international law or a progressive development.45  
Article 15 of the Statute of International Law Commission shows 
the difference between progressive development versus codification of 
international law.  The Statute provides that the progressive development 
of international law means “the preparation of Draft Convention on 
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international law or in 
regard to which law has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice 
of states.”46 On the other hand, codification of international law is defined 
to contemplate “the more precise formulation and systematization of rules 
of international law in the fields where there already has been extensive 
state practice, precedent, and doctrine.”47   
While submitting the final set of rules regarding the law of the 
treaties, the ILC did not specifically categorize whether its work was on 
the progressive development or on codification.  In fact, in its cover letter, 
the Commission stated that its work on the law of the treaties constitutes 
both codification and progressive development of international law to the 
extent these concepts were defined in Article 15 of the Commission’s 
Statute.  It is not practicable to determine into which category each 
provision falls.48  
Consequently, a similar effect is to be given towards the 
peremptory norm, in the sense that it is partly a codification and partly a 
                                                 
45 See IAN MCTAGGERT SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE 
TREATIES 104-06 (1984); Carin Kahgan, Jus Cogens and inherent right to Self-defence, 
available at http://www.nsulaw.nova.edu/student/organizations/ILSAJournal/3-
3/Kahgan%203-3.htm (last visited Sep. 17, 2001) (on file with author).  
46 Statute of International Law Commission art 15, available at 
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/statufra.htm.  
47 SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 11. 
48 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n (1966) at 177; SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 12; Khagan, supra 
note 44. 
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progressive development of international law.49  It is partly a codification 
because the ILC acknowledged that the peremptory norm exists in 
international law, which permits no derogation and sets down a general 
definition of jus cogens.  Furthermore, it is partly progressive development 
in relation to the specifics (i.e., which norms were to be accorded jus 
cogens status).  The ILC left this latter part to be worked out by state 
practice and the jurisprudence on international tribunals.50  
Article 2(4) of the Charter, which prohibits unilateral use of force 
and threat of armed force, corresponds to the pre-existent norms of 
international law.  Therefore, the notion that the regime is applicable to the 
Charter independently of the Vienna Convention was supported by the fact 
that the Charter’s prohibition on the use of force was a norm jus cogens 
and declarative of a pre-existent normative regime.  Furthermore, the ICJ 
in the Nicaragua case confirmed that the restriction on use of force was a 
recognized normative regime in customary international law before the 
Charter. 51   Consequently, even where the Vienna Convention is not 
applicable, the principles of Articles 53 and 64 would be effective as 
customary law.  Article 53 notes that a treaty that is contrary to an existing 
rule of jus cogens is void ab initio. 52   Additionally, Article 64 of the 
Vienna Convention provided that if a new peremptory norm of general 
international law emerges, any existing treaty in conflict with that norm 
becomes void and terminable.  By virtue of Article 64, an existing treaty 
that conflicts with an emergent rule of jus cogens terminates from the date 
of the emergence of the rule.  It is not void ab initio.  Nor by Article 71 is 
any right, obligation or legal situation created by the treaty prior to its 
                                                 
49 HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 162.  
50 Id.; Kahgan, supra note 45. 
51 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), supra 
note 13, at 126-34 ¶¶ 175-94.  
52 See 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 52, at 91-92, UN Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1963. 
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termination affected so long as its maintenance is not in itself contrary to 
the new peremptory norm.53  The inclusion of the norm as enshrined in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter enhances its non-detractable nature since any 
action in contravention thereof is a breach of a state’s obligation under the 
Charter.  However, as jus cogens status is not created by the Charter, the 
argument really rests on the notion that what is incorporated in the Charter 
is the pre-existent norm, the universality and acceptance of which is 
evidenced by inclusion in the Charter.54 To the extent that these norms 
were pre-existent and merely codified in the Charter, the Charter becomes 
subject to the operation of jus cogens even though it came into force 
before the promulgation of the Vienna Convention.55  
Jus Cogens Test of Article 2(4) 
As discussed, the principle of prohibiting use of force is a pre-
existent, customary norm in international law.  This norm has been 
reflected in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which reads as follows: “All 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use 
of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United 
Nations.”56  
Territorial integrity or political independence of a state 
corresponds to the term “sovereignty,” which is the basic fundamental 
issue of international law.  Use of force (or threat of use of force) against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of a state clearly 
demonstrates the violation of sovereign right.  The U.N. Charter upholds 
this position in Article 2(4) that such violation is not justified under 
present international law.  The Charter holds this position as a reflection of 
                                                 
53 SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (1991). 
54 See generally Kahgan, supra note 45. 
55 SINCLAIR, supra note 45, at 12. 
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the customary norm57 and thereby prohibits all use (or threat of use) of 
force or action with respect to the state in any other manner inconsistent 
with the purposes of the United Nations.58  The remedy for the violation of 
this principle invokes the “inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense,” as stated in article 51 of the Charter.  It clearly indicates that this 
right is to be applied when an armed attacked has occurred.   
However, another option is available in this regard.  Under Article 
39, the Security Council could determine whether a real threat exists for 
the maintenance of international peace and security.  If the Security 
Council finds in the positive, then further action can be taken, either 
through military or through non-military measures, in order to restore the 
peace and security.  The inherent right of self-defense in the case of an 
armed attack is only permissible up to the point that the necessary 
measures are taken by the Security Council.  Therefore, the absolute 
remedy for the violation of Article 2(4) sits in Chapter VII of the Charter 
with the authority of the Security Council.  Article 51, which prohibits 
reprisals but permits a balanced and proportionate defensive action against 
an armed attack, is nonetheless regarded as an “inherent” right 
representing the pre-existing norm of international law.59         
The development of the notion enshrined in Article 2(4) involves 
the long, historical progress of the prohibition of war in the relations 
among states.  The cause of war has been restructured throughout the ages.  
                                                                                                                         
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. 
57 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1: “The organization is based on the principle of the 
sovereign equality of all its Members.” 
58 U.N. CHARTER arts. 1-2 (stating the purposes and principles of the United Nations). 
59 Under customary international law reprisals were, however, lawful if certain criteria 
were met, the criteria as attributed to the Naulilaa Arbitration that there must have been a 
prior deliberate violation of international law; that an unsuccessful attempt must have 
been made at redress; and action taken in reprisal is proportionate to the injury suffered. 
See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEM AND PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE 
USE IT 240 (1994).  
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The Geneva Convention of 1864 and the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 
1868 led to the Hague Conventions, which sought to codify customary 
principles to make warfare more humane through the development of the 
terms jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  The former determines whether the 
cause of war is a just one, while the latter determines whether the mode of 
fighting is just.60   
At the end of World War I, the League of Nations was formed in 
order to give peace an institutional framework and to prohibit future war.  
The Covenant of the League, however, proved to be “an imperfect 
prohibition of war because of textual limitations, lack of will on the part of 
the members, and the absence of the USSR and the United States at the 
inception of what was to have been a new global system.”61  Article 10 of 
the Covenant, which is regarded as the teeth of the Covenant, declared a 
commitment to not only respect but also preserve the territorial integrity 
and political independence of all members.  This created a binding 
obligation upon all states to act individually and collectively through the 
Council of the League to defend other individual states against wars of 
aggression.  In one sense this provided a guarantee of sovereignty of an 
individual state, and on the other, this limited the right to go to war.  It did 
this by means of threatening collective action against those who initiated 
war without just cause – a notion defined as premature recourse to 
hostilities before the exhaustion of available means for peaceful conflict 
resolution.   
It is not, however, until 1928, after the conclusion of the General 
Treaty for the Renunciation of War (mostly known as Kellogg-Briand 
Pact) that war was declared prohibited.  Article 2 of the Pact states “that 
                                                 
60 See THOMAS FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 245 
(1995). 
61 Id. at 255. 
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the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or 
whatever origin they may be, which may arise among [the Parties], shall 
never be sought except by pacific means.”62  The preamble of the Pact 
proclaims “a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of policy.”63  
According to Professor Ian Brownlie, the Kellogg-Briand norm 
prohibiting war-making had by 1939 become so well established as “to 
justify the assertion that a customary rule had developed.”64  After the end 
of Second World War, the continued, normative pull of Kellogg-Briand 
was evidenced by the framing of charges against the defendants at the war 
crimes trials of the Nuremberg Tribunal.  Kellogg-Briand appeared to be 
the blueprint for the new United Nations Charter system.65  Therefore, the 
idea enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter was nothing new.  It 
developed through the customary process of law-making and was codified 
in the Charter only as a pre-existent norm.     
The Charter is an instrument where almost the whole community 
of states is the party, rather than a large majority of states.66  These parties 
agree with the norm, as reflected in the Article 2(4) of the Charter.  The 
norm is so important that it gains the status of general international law 
and is accepted and recognized by the international community of states as 
a whole, including all the significant components of the international 
                                                 
62 Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 2, available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm.  
63 See id.; see also FRANCK, supra note 60, at 258.  
64 IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND USE OF FORCE BY STATES 108, 110 (1963). 
65 FRANCK, supra note 60, at 259. 
66 Until the year of 2000, 189 states were parties to the United Nations, see www.un.org. 
States outside the U.N. consist of the permanently neutral Switzerland, a few divided 
states, and a number of small states with limited international capacity which participate 
only to a limited extent in international activities. See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 
220.  
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community from all major legal systems.67  Moreover, non-members of the 
U.N. recognize the basic principles of the Charter.  Therefore, the Article 
2(4) principle has achieved such importance that all states, including non-
members of the UN, agree on its non-derogable character.  Any 
derogation, therefore, gives rise to action by the Security Council: firstly, 
by means of individual or collective self-defense without Security Council 
involvement,68 and secondly, by means of enforcement measures taken by 
the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, or alternatively, by 
the Regional Arrangement or Agencies which hold authorization from the 
Security Council.69  
Regarding the obligation to the non-parties to the UN, Article 2(6) 
of the Charter states that non-members of the United Nations shall act in 
accordance with the principles so far as may be necessary for the 
maintenance of international peace and security.  Although the Charter is a 
treaty instrument that holds a superior position among the treaties, it is 
capable of binding non-parties at least so far as the rules of general 
international law are concerned.  For example, Switzerland has made it 
known that it does not consider itself bound by decisions and resolutions 
of the U.N., even though it has not in practice challenged U.N. 
interpretations of its basic principles.70     
Debate at the 1945 San Francisco Conference clearly indicated that 
the delegates were unanimously committed to the creation of an 
organization with the authority to uphold international peace, wherever it 
                                                 
67 See John F. Murphy, Force and Arms, in UNITED NATIONS LEGAL ORDER 255 (Oscar 
Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995) (arguing many states, including the United 
States, take the legal position that article 2(4) is a peremptory norm (jus cogens)). 
68 U.N. CHARTER art. 51. 
69 U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1. 
70 See HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 223-224.  
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is threatened.  Such authority is not compatible with the full autonomy of 
non-members.71   
According to Brownlie, Article 2(4) constitutes an exception to the 
rule that a treaty binds only the parties to it.  The exception is based on the 
specific character of the U.N. as an organization concerned primarily with 
international peace and security.  On the basis of that provision, certain 
obligations on the part of non-members may arise under general 
international law.72   
It is quite clear from the Preamble of the Charter73 as well as from 
the basic principles thereof that: (1) the included provisions are for the 
general interest of the entire international community, (2) they constitute 
the supreme rule that states are based on sovereign equality, and (3) 
territorial integrity and political independence of the states are inviolable.  
These concepts are to be protected in order to maintain international peace 
and security at large.  No state, regardless of its U.N. membership, can 
thus violate such basic norms.  To compromise with the non-members 
with respect to those norms means to compromise with the maintenance of 
international legal order designed for international peace and security.   
States’ sovereign rights incur responsibilities, such as 
responsibilities not to resort to threat of force or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state.  The state cannot 
rule out such basic principles even if it is not a party to the treaty 
embodying such principles.  A treaty attempting to impose duties on third-
                                                 
71 Richard A. Falk, The Authority of the United Nations Over Non-Members, in 
HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 220.  
72 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 691 (1979). 
73 “[T]o save succeeding generation from the scourge of war, . . .  to practice tolerance 
and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and to unite our strength 
to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure, by the acceptance of 
principles and the institutions of methods, that armed force shall not be used save in the, 
common interest.” U.N. CHARTER preamble. 
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party states is not void, as is a treaty in violation of a jus cogens norm.74  
Therefore, the principle that a treaty cannot impose obligations upon non-
parties becomes unavoidable.  Article 2(6) is a mandatory provision and 
has set a limit, determined by the general interest of the international 
community, to the application of the main principles of the U.N. Charter.75   
These basic normative principles of the Charter have been 
accepted as universally obligatory; non-members have accepted them as 
basic customary rules.76 The universality of these basic principles of the 
Charter is supported by a number of important declarations of the General 
Assembly, which speak for the obligations of all states not just of U.N. 
members.  The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations was adopted unanimously by the General 
Assembly in 1970.77  This declaration provided the interpretation of seven 
basic principles of the Charter, speaks consistently of the obligations of 
“every state,” and characterizes those principles as basic principles of 
international law.  As a result, these main principles gain the status of 
peremptory norm in nature from which derogation is never permitted 
unless another peremptory norm of similar standard is developed. 
Conclusion 
In general, International Law is criticized for the lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.  However, at least in cases within the realm of 
international peace and security, the Security Council may take necessary 
                                                 
74 CRAWFORD, supra note 4, at 80. 
75 See OPPENHEIM & LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955); HANNIKAINEN, supra 
note 11, at 222-223. 
76 HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 222-223.  
77 GA Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970). See also GA 
Res. 2734, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., at 22, U.N. Doc. A/ (1970); GA Res. 33/73, U.N. 
GAOR, 33rd Sess., at 178, U.N. Doc. A/RES/33/37 (1978); GA Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 
20th Sess., at 11 (1965); GA Res. 36/103, U.N. GAOR, 36th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/36/103 (1981); see HANNIKAINEN, supra note 11, at 223 n.64.  
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action in order to repeal any violation of international law that could 
endanger international peace and security, so long as it falls within the 
limits of Article 39.  Article 2(4) of the Charter, which is merely a 
reaffirmation of the pre-existent norm in the Charter, is a peremptory norm 
under international law and the fundamental provision of the Charter.   
Yet there remained the question of who would determine the 
violation of the norm reflected in Article 2(4) in the disorganized 
international society.  The Charter empowers the Security Council, a non-
judicial body, to make a formal determination concerning violations of 
Article 2(4) as well as the violation of other principles of the Charter.  For 
example, the Security Council may identify certain situations as a “threat 
to the peace” under Article 39 because of a violation of the principles laid 
down in Article 2(4) of the Charter.  The Council may then take further 
actions for the enforcement of peace.  A direct relationship is then found 
between “threat or use of force” under Article 2(4) and a “threat to the 
peace”, “breach of peace,” and “act of aggression” under Article 39, which 
grants the Security Council jurisdiction under Chapter VII.   
The power of the Security Council under Article 39 is, inter alia, 
to investigate whether a breach of Article 2(4) is constituted, yet it is 
apparent that the interpretation of Article 39 goes far beyond that.  Article 
2(4) did not only prohibit threat or use of force against territorial integrity 
or political independence.   It also stated that threat or use of force is 
prohibited if it is in any way inconsistent with the purposes of the Charter.  
This article allows the Security Council to find a broad meaning of “threat 
to the peace.”  According to Professor Hans Kelsen, it is completely 
within the discretion of the Security Council to decide what constitutes a 
threat to the peace.78  Indeed, the Security Council is not fettered in its 
                                                 
78 HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 727 (1950). 
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powers of determination under Article 39, but the duty of customary law 
and the general international law incorporated in the Charter limits such 
discretion to be absolute.  As a result, the peremptory norm, such as jus 
cogens, now an established principle in international law and incorporated 
in the Charter as a pre-existent norm, also limits absolute discretion of the 
Security Council.   
Technically, peace becomes threatened or breached when there is 
violation of the Charter principles.  As established earlier, the basis of the 
Charter principles was deeply rooted in the supreme interest of the entire 
international community of states and such principles gained the character 
of jus cogens. Article 39 of the Charter, one may assume, confirms that a 
violation of the norm of jus cogens exists, while a clear violation of article 
2(4) and other principles of the Charter is found, which by nature is 
constitutive of threat to the peace, or a breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression.   
Therefore, the role of the Security Council is also to safeguard the 
hierarchical norms of international law.  Unless a violation of the 
principles of the Charter has occurred, peace and security can hardly be 
endangered.  The Security Council is the body responsible for protecting 
such laws, from which infringement may constitute a threat to the peace, a 
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.  In this sense, the Security 
Council itself is also under an obligation to follow such legal principles.  
For example, a limit of the Security Council under Article 39 is defined by 
Article 2(4), specifically, “to go beyond that and, say, the determination 
that a situation was a ‘threat to the peace’ when it was not a ‘threat of 
force’ would be ultra virus.” 79   However, the changing structure of 
international order shows that a violation of other Charter principles that 
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are inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations could constitute 
an infringement of the norm of jus cogens and thereby could be brought to 
attention under Article 39 grounds (e.g., gross violation of human rights, 
genocide, systematic rape, apartheid and so on). 
                                                                                                                         
79 N. D. WHITE, KEEPING THE PEACE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF 
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 35 (1993). 
